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IN THE

Supreme Court of the State of Utah

CARL W. THORSTENSEN,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
SID WEESE,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.
9899

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action by respondent upon a Memorandum of
Contract for the sale by respondent to the appellant of sixtyfour share of stock in Ogden U tab Knitting Company for
$3,200.00. The appellant paid $2 ,200.00, and refused to pay
the balance for the reason that the stock when the contract
was entered into was worthless, and that the contract was
entered into under mutual mistake of fact, both parties in
good faith believing that the stock had substantial value.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This matter was tried to the Court without a jury. Judgment was rendered in favor of the respondent for the unpaid
balance of the contract, i. e., $1,000.00 and dismissing appellant's Counterclaim to rescind and for restsitution of the
$2,200.00 _paid (R. 7, 10).
1
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Ogden Utah Knitting Company for over sixty years was
engaged at Ogden, Utah in the manufacture and sale of certain articles of wearing apparel.
The agreement (R. 2) was entered into in good faith by
both parties on December 28, 1961. Several months later,
July, 1962, after the taking of a physical inventory, and upon
preparation of a operating statement, it was determined that
the company sustained an operating loss for the year 1961 of
$159,289.00 (Tr. 52). The company had previously lost,
without its fault, the right to use the trade-mark for LDS
garments, the use of which, prior to the loss, accounted for
more than fifty per cent of its total business. In 1961 it was
attempting to convert its operations from manufacture of
LDS garments to other lines of merchandise, and to establish
a market for the new lines. Losses sustained by being deprived
of the use of the LDS trade-mark, and inability to promote
and establish itself in new lines resulted in the insolvency of
the company. This was not, and could not be determined
until after the taking of physical inventory early in 1962,
and the audit of its financial affairs and the preparation by
the company accountant of an operating and financial statement for 1961. See testimony of Herbert ]. Corkey, Sr., CPA
(Tr. 50-66 incl.). The company was bankrupt, (Tr. 19, 34,
44, 45, 54, 55, 56, 59).
Both respondent and appellant, at the time of entering
into the purchase and sale agreement, were officers and employees of the company, and each thought the stock worth
the agreed upon purchase price, i. e., $50.00 per share, whereas the operating and financial statements later prepared are
conclusive that the stock had no value. Both parties made
inquiry from Charles C. Thorstensen, President-General Manager, and principal stockholder of the company who had dur2
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ing 1961 paid $70.00 per share for some of the company stock,
who advised them that in his opinion the stock was worth
about $50.00 per share. Both relied on that (Tr. 23, 33).
Appellant claims that since the stock actually had no
value at the time of the agreement; that there was a mutual
mistake of fact as to the stock having any value; that he is
entitled to rescind the purchase agreement, and to recover that
part of the purchase price already paid to the respondent, and
that the respondent should retain the stock. The Trial Court
found that the stock on December 28, 1961 had value, that
both parties were assuming a risk in entering into the agreement, and that there was not a mutual mistake of fact as to
the value of said stock (R. 8).
Appellant claims that the finding that the stock had value
on December 28, 1961, and that there was not a mutual mistake of fact with respect to it having any value is contrary
to all of the evidence, and that the Court then in effect disbelieved all of the evidence adduced with respect to value, and
that its findings, conclusions, and decree are based upon no
evidence at all, and are contrary to all of the evidence.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks to have the findings, conclusions and
judgment reversed, and the Trial Court instructed to enter
contrary findings and conclusions, and enter judgment in favor
of the appellant permitting him to rescind and to recover from
respondent that part of the purchase price already paid.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This Is an action brought by respondent against the ap3
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pellant for judgment in the sum of $1,000.00 with interest,
representing the unpaid balance of an agreement dated December 28, 1961 between the parties wherein appellant agreed to
purchase sixty-four shares of stock in Ogden Utah Knitting
Company, a Utah corporation, doing business at Ogden, Utah.
Appellant paid $2,000.00 on the agreement at the time of its
execution, and agreed to pay the balance of $1,200.00 at
$100.00 per month beginning with January 31, 1962. He paid
two monthly installments, and then upon discovering that the
stock had no value at the time of execution of the agreement
refused to pay more, and demanded the return of that part
of the price already paid.
Respondent was a stockholder and had been since 1940,
and was vice president of the corporation. Appellant was appointed manager of the corporation October 8, 1961, at which
time he was given twenty-five shares of stock in the corporation by the president of the company, (Tr. 20).
While there was some reason to believe the company was
having some financial troubles, the extent and effect thereof
were not known until after the closing of its books, preparation of inventory, operating statement and financial statement, and a determination made therefrom in July, 1962,
(Tr. 54). At that time it was determinied by the company
auditor, Herbert ]. Corkey, Sr., CPA, that the company was
insolvent, its assets so depleted that any value theretofore had
by the stock was completely wiped out, and it was unable to
meet its obligations to other creditors, and that that condition
existed back and prior to the date of the purchase agreement,
and that neither of the contracting parties knew, or could have
known these facts until the CPA had made his determination
and report.

4
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
FINDING OF. THE COURT THAT "THE STOCK ON OR
ABOUT DECEMBER 28th HAD VALUE, AND BOTH
PARTIES WERE ASSUMING A RISK IN ENTERING
INTO THE STOCK SALE, AND THERE WAS NOT A
MUTUAL MISTAKE AS TO THE VALUE OF SAID
STOCK."
POINT II
THAT THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT "PLAINTIFF SHOULD
BE AWARDED THE SUM OF ONE THOUSAND
($1,000.00) DOLLARS AS DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF
CONTRACT, AND THE DEFENDANT SHOULD BE
AWARDED THE SIXTY-FOUR (64) SHARES OF
STOCK,
AND
DEFENDANT'S
COUNTERCLAIM
SHOULD BE DISMISSED WITH NO CAUSE OF ACTION." AND SAID CONCLUSION IS AGAINST LAW.
POINT III
THAT THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT "JUDGMENT
SHOULD BE ENTERED IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF,
AND AGAINST DEFENDANT FOR THE SUM OF ONE
THOUSAND ($1,000.00) DOLLARS, AND FOR INTEREST AND COURT COSTS INCURRED HEREIN,
AND DEFENDANT SHOULD BE AWARDED THE SIXTY-FOUR (64) SHARES OF STOCK IN SAID CORPORATION AND DEFENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIM DIS-
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MISSED WITH NO CAUSE FOR ACTION." AND SAID
CONCLUSION IS AGAINST LAW.
POINT IV
THAT THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT AWARDING PLAINTIFF THE
SUM OF ONE THOUSAND ($1,000.00) DOLLARS, TOGETHER WITH INTEREST AT SIX (6%) PER CENT,
AND COSTS, OR ANY SUl\1 AT ALL, AND SAID JUDGMENT IS AGAINST LAW.
Since all of the points stated, and relied upon by the
appellant, tie into and relate to the salient claim of the appellant, i. e., that the agreement was entered into through
a mutual mistake of fact, in the interest of time and space,
it would appear proper to argue all of said points concurrently.
The following facts are not controverted by any evidence:
1.

There was no quoted market value for the stock
described in the agreement to purchase.

2.

That both appellant and respondent believed as a
fact that the stock had substantial value.

3.

That at the time the agreement was executed, the
stock had no value.

4.

That fact number "3" was not established, and
could not be established by them, or either of them at
or prior to the execution of the agreement.

5.

That the stock has never been delivered to the appellant.

6.

That appellant and respondent relied upon the same
source of information in fixing value.

7.

That there was no consideration for appellant's
6
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8.

promise to pay, and for the payments actually made.
There is no evidence of changed conditions in respondent's position. Lawson vs. Woodmen of the
World, 88 Utah, 267, 53, Pac. 2d. 432.

Appellant claims, in view of the foregoing, that he is in
no different position than one who buys spurious stock from
another, neither of whom knowing the stock was spurious, but
believing it to be genuine. The issue here is not "market
value" of the stock, but that the stock had no value at all:

"It is a firmly established general rule that money
paid to another under the influence of a mistake of
fact, that is, on the mistaken supposition of the existence of a specific fact which would entitle the
other to the money, which would not have been paid,
if it had been known to the payor that the fact was
otherwise, may be recovered provided the payment
has not caused such a change in the position of the
payee that it would be unjust to require a refund."
40 Am. Jur., Payment, Sec. 187. (See also Williston
on Contracts, Sec. 1556-1573); Restatement Restitution, Sec. 26, 39, 49; American National Bank of
Chicago vs. McKay 102 F. 662; Great Northern Ry.
Co. vs. Reid, 245 F. 86. There is no evidence of
changed conditions, Utley vs. Donaldson 94 U.S. 29.
"To recover money paid under mistake, the payment must have been made under a mistaken belief
that the money was due the payee, when in truth
it was neither legally nor morally due. An error of
fact is ordinarily said to take place either when some
fact which really exists is unknown, or some fact is
supposed to exist, which really does not exist." 40
Am. Jur., Payment, Sec. 189, 193; Smith vs. Rubel,
140 Ore. 422, 13 Pac. 2d 1078; 87 A.L.R. 647;
Grand Lodge A. 0. U. W. vs. Towne, 136 Minn. 72,
161 N.W. 403; Sutton vs. Peterson (Wash.) 1938,
74 Pac. 2d 885.
7
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The only evidence as to the value of this stock, or
whether it actually had any value at all is found in the testimony of the expert witness, Herbert J. Corkey, Sr., CPA.
His testimony contains an analysis of the facts and conditions
upon which value must be based. His testimony is fairly
short, (Tr. 50-60). The writer is of the opinion that a reading of this witness' testimony in full by the Court would be
far more enlightening on the issue involved than by quoting
select portions of it.

It is said in Am. Jur. 40, Payment, Section 216, "Money
Paid for Worthless Articles,"
"It is firmly established that an action lies to recover
back money paid for an article which is entirely
worthless. Thus, a purchaser and holder of counterfeit United States bonds, redeemed by the United
States after his purchase, may recover the purchase
money without returning the bonds, and before repaying the United States, and money paid for a bill
which turns out to be counterfeit may be recovered,
for a payment for such a bill must be regarded as a
payment by mistake for a thing of no value, but
which was, at the time it was received, believed to
be and imported on its face to be of instrinsic worth."
This Court said in Board of Education of Sevier School
District vs. Board of Education of Piute School District, 85
Ut. 276, 39 Pac. 2d. 340, apparently quoting with approval
from 13 C. ]. Page 377,
"That where certain facts assumed by both parties
are the basis of a contract, and subsequently it appears that such facts did not exist THERE IS NO
AGREEMENT, and thus where parties agree in
regard to a thing which unknown to both parties
does not exist at the time THERE IS NO CON8
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TRACT. THERE IS NO SUBJECT MATTER."
(Emphasis ours).
It is said in 13 C.]., Page 369,

"A mistake of fact takes place when some material
fact which really exists is unknown or when some
essential fact, which is supposed to exist really does
not exist" and on Page 3 75, "a mutual mistake as
to material facts will void the agreement." (Citing
cases).
Applying this rule to the instant case, the Ogden Utah
Knitting Company was insolvent, and its stock had no value,
but on the contrary a negative value, (Tr. 55). There is no
evidence in this record to the contrary. Hence, a material
fact (insolvency hence no value) existed at the time the agreement was executed and this fact was unkown. Put conversely,
the contracting parties assumed the fact to be that the company was solvent, and that its stock had value, which fact did
not exist. In the school board case (supra), the contracting
parties entered into an agreement with respect to the location
of the precinct of Koosharem. This contract between the two
districts was based upon the assumption or belief that it was
uncertain in which of the two contracting districts the said
precinct was located, and the agreement concerned itself with
a payment of costs, and expenses of the school located in
Koosharem by the two contracting parties, since the fact assumed was that the location of the Koosharem precinct,
whether in plaintiff or defendant district, was uncertain, they
agreed to share the costs. It subsequently developed and the
true facts were that by a previous court decision it had been
definitely established that Koosharem was located in the plaintiff district. Hence, this Court found and decided that since
both the contracting parties were mistaken with respect to a
material fact (location), that there was no basis for the con9
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tract. This Court said; "THE SURVEY WAS ACKNOWLEDGED, AND EVER SINCE ACQUIESCED IN, AND SO
FAR AS MADE TO APPEAR WAS NOT QUESTIONED
UNTIL 1923 WHEN THE THEN MEMBERS OF THE
SCHOOL BOARDS ASSUMED THERE WAS SOME UNCERTAINTY WHICH DID NOT EXIST AS TO THE
TRUE BOUNDARY LINE. THE MEMBERS OF THE
TWO BOARDS WHO ENTERED INTO THE AGREEMENT MAY HAVE BEEN IGNORANT OF SUCH SURVEY, AND OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH
BOUNDARY LINE. WHETHER THEY WERE OR NOT,
THEIR ASSUMPTION OF UNCERTAINTY HAD NO
EXISTENCE IN FACT." (Emphasis ours). "Notwithstanding that, it now, because of an unfounded and nonexisting uncertainty, and mutual mistake of fact, not of law,
seeks to enforce the contract or agreement against the Piute
School District, which is still executory on behalf of the
latter."
The Trial Court refused to enforce the agreement on the
grounds of want of power, and of legal authority of the Boards
to enter into such an agreement. With respect to that theory
this Court said; "Much may be said in support of that, but
in examining the ruling we need not go that far. We prefer
to put the affirmance on rules and principle of equity as
shown by authorities referred to, and under which relief
should be granted against the enforcement of the agreement
as alleged in the Complaint, and not as found by the Court."
Numerous other authorities could be cited. (See Bowles vs.
Miller, Colo. 1935, 40 Pac. 2d 243). However, in the opinion
of the writer the above and foregoing authorities cited state
the general rule, and the great weight of authority. Further
citations would be more or less cumulative and time and space
consuming.
10
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It is inconsistent, in view of the facts and evidence in
this case, that appellant would have agreed to purchase this
stock had he not believed that it had substantial value. The
evidence is conclusive that he did believe it had substantial
value; that respondent believed it had substantial value, and
that both parties relied upon these assumed facts which did
not exist, and hence were mutually mistaken; not that one
party believed it had one value and the other party believing
it had a different value, but uniting on a mistaken belief that
the facts were that it did have substantial value, and that a
reliance upon that fact was a material element relied upon in
the consummation of the agreement. The uncontroverted facts
are that contrary to the judgment of the Trial Court the parties
were actually contracting to buy and to sell nothing. If appellant rescinds and is granted restitution, the respondent loses
nothing. He still has his stock which is worth nothing.
If, on the other hand, the judgment of the Trial Court
is permitted to stand, then appellant will be required to
pay $3 ,200.00, and get nothing in return. In other words, it
sums up to the fact that there was no consideration for the
transaction from its inception, and equity proposes and undertakes to avoid such a result. Assuming for the sake of the
argument that the stock in question actually belonged to a
third party, but that both of the contracting parties believed
it belonged to the respondent who was not acting by or in
behalf of, or under circumstances in which he could bind the
true owner, so far as the parties in that case are concerned,
the stock would have no value to either of the contracting
parties, and hence there would be no consideration for the
contract. It would seem to the writer that the ultimate facts
in that hypothetical case, and the instant case would be identical, and that the rule of law which would permit, under the

11
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assumed circumstances, rescission and restitution, applies with
equal force and to the same effect in the instant case.
Notice of Rescission of Contract was not necessary to
maintenance of action for moneys had and received on the
ground that there has been a total failure of consideration,
Westbrook vs. Reneau, 278 Pac. 2d 32, 129 C.A. 2d 715.
Cherry vs. Hayden, 223 Pac. 2d 878-100 C.A. 2d 416.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion it would seem on the record in
that equity compels the reversal of the judgment of
Court, because it is based upon findings of fact
clusions of law which are diametrically opposed to
the weight of, but all of the evidence in the case.

this case
the Trial
and connot only

We respectfully submit that the judgment should be
reversed, findings should be made contrary to those found by
the Trial Court, the conclusions and judgment reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
HUGGINS & HUGGINS
IRA A. HUGGINS.
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